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Sunderland, c. 1850 ‑ c. 1875
by

Tom McLean, University of Newcastle Upon Tyne
Between c.1750 – c.1850 the
world wood shipbuilding industry
was marked by a series of competitive shifts, from Dutch leadership
prior to 1800 (Unger, 1978) to British, French and American struggles
for dominance through to the 1850s
(Slaven, 1980). The British industry was cushioned by rising trade,
but beset by poor ship design and
heavy duties on the necessary timber imports (Jones, 1957). However, pressure from shipowners led
to improvements in British ship
design and Britain survived as a
leading player in the world wood
shipbuilding industry, albeit as a
relatively high cost producer given
that British ships were about 25 per
cent more expensive than their
American counterparts (Jones,
1957; Slaven, 1980). From the
1850s onwards, there was a technological revolution in shipbuilding
as iron began to replace wood in
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the construction of the hulls of
ships (Clarke, 1986). The current
paper examines the role of accounting information in shipbuilders’
decisions to replace wood by iron
as the primary material of hull construction and thus bring about technological and organisational transformations of the industry.
The context
Essentially, the demand for ships
is the outcome of a complex set of
relationships between the volume
and pattern of trade, freight rates,
the size, speed and age of existing
fleets and technical advances in
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construction (Jones, 1957; Pollard
and Robertson, 1979; Slaven,
1980). Shipbuilding is a capital
goods industry par excellence
(Slaven, 1980), subject to violent
swings in the demand for its products, and, given this, the prospect
of bankruptcy always loomed large
for the shipbuilder during the nineteenth century (Todd, 1985). By
the mid-1850s, British shipbuilders
had developed a routine process for
the building of iron ships (Harley,
1973) and by the 1860s had capitalised on their cheap natural resources and pool of skilled engi2

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_notebook/vol29/iss2/1

THE ACCOUNTING
HISTORIANS NOTEBOOK
Editor: Joann Noe Cross
College of Business Administration
University of Wisconsin Oshkosh
Oshkosh WI 54901
Fax: (920) 424-7413
E-mail: crossj@uwosh.edu
Assoc. Editor: Elliott L. Slocum
School of Accountancy
Georgia State University
P.O. Box 4050
Atlanta GA 30302
Fax: (404) 651-1033
E-mail: accels@langate.gsu.edu

HOME PAGE
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/
aah
Web Administrator:
Jon Lee, Rutgers University
jonlee@raw.rutgers.edu
Secretary:
Sandy Welch
210-497-1806
swelch@utsa.edu

neers to such an extent that Great
Britain was not only the world’s
leading shipbuilder “but for some
time practically monopolized”
(Pollard and Robertson, 1979,
p.12) iron shipbuilding. In 1862,
Britain’s iron shipbuilding equaled
its wooden tonnage for the first
time and then moved inexorably
ahead (Clarke, 1986, p.1). Nevertheless, within Britain there were
regional variations in the rate of
adoption of the new material and
its technology. Sunderland, on the
River Wear on the North East
Coast of England was a centre of
shipbuilding activity (Clarke, 1981;
The Accounting Historians Notebook, October 2006
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Table 1
Iron shipbuilding output (tons) in Sunderland 1853 – 1871, by firm
Year

Laing

Oswald*

Pile

Doxford

1853
1854
1855
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871

479
577
939
nil
610
3,083
2,003
2,573
6,153
5,429
6,307
6,525
7,681
5,084
2,569
8,097
7,058
14,502
15,246

497
3,798
3,903
4,115
6,081
7,974
7,171
6,477
3,126
9,622
18,983
12,399
15,485

2,580
4,752
5,093
5,430
4,708
1,533
4,853
7,296
8,146
10,177
12,926

2,191
2,212
3,198
1,823
4,071
2,122
3,724
7,214

Illiff* Thompson

965
1,677
5,240
4,478
5,181
6,091

1,112
1,073
2,296
4,384

Blumer

Watson

Short

1,790
nil
533

912
3,750
6,118

2610

* Oswald opened a purpose-built iron shipyard; he was a nephew of James Laing
and had started his career in wood shipbuilding; Illiff’s was a purpose-built iron
shipyard; all other shipyards were converted from wood to iron shipbuilding.
Adapted from Clarke, 1986, p. 69

Pollard and Robertson, 1979) and
by the 1850s claimed to be the
greatest shipbuilding town in the
world (Smith and Holden, 1953).
However, this claim was based on
the town’s wood shipbuilding industry. In the 1850s Sunderland
had between sixty to seventy shipyards; the shipyards were generally
very small-scale, each employing
about 30 men, industry entry and
exit costs were minimal, land
prices were low and labour forces
flexible (McLean, 1995). At a competitive advantage in terms of
wood shipbuilding, Sunderland
lagged behind the national average
in the rate of changeover to iron
The Accounting Historians Notebook, October 2006
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shipbuilding: in Sunderland, tonnage output of iron shipbuilding
did not overtake that of wood until
1868, significantly later than the
national changeover date of 1862
(Clarke, 1986). Moreover, within
Sunderland itself there was considerable time variation between firms
in the adoption of iron shipbuilding
(Table 1).
The current research analyses
the roles of personality, business
environment and accounting information in order to explain this
variation, focusing on two particular firms, Laing and Doxford, these
firms being selected for research on
(Continued on page 4)
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(Continued from page 3)

the basis of the availability of archive material (Note 1). The remainder of this paper is organised
into five sections: first, wood and
iron shipbuilding are compared;
second, an analysis is made of the
development of the Laing and Doxford shipyards; third, there is a consideration of the role of accounting
information for decision‑making in
shipbuilding; fourth, there is a discussion of the material presented in
the paper; and, fifth, conclusions
are drawn.
Wood and iron ships compared
Between c.1850 – c.1875, wood
ships could generally match iron
ships in terms of size, quality,
speed and technical specification.
However “in Britain by the end of
the 1850s it is probable that iron
ships could generally be built more
cheaply than wooden vessels”
(Clarke, 1986, p.47), mainly because British iron was a cheaper
raw material than imported wood.
In 1861, the Sunderland Herald
noted that “iron vessels, with a full
East India outfit, can be purchased
at prices varying from £15 to
£l5.15s.0d per ton; while a wooden
vessel of the same class could not
at present be laid down in any of
the (Sunderland) yards . . . at the
same figure” (ibid, p.49). Although
relative raw material costs did vary
from time to time, it is clear that
the cost advantage lay with iron
shipbuilding which also benefited
from increasing mechanisation and
improving labour productivity,
4
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given that metal‑workers were paid
on piece‑work while wood-workers were paid on time‑rates. These
cost advantages made iron rather
than wood ships increasingly attractive to shipowners and iron
shipyards were developed to meet
the changing demand (Clarke,
1966, 1981, 1986, 1988). The application of new materials and
technology changed much in the
shipbuilding industry; whereas
shipwrights and other woodworkers had naturally dominated
the wood shipbuilding industry,
“overwhelmingly, in Britain, the
men who built the first iron ships
were from a mechanical engineering background” (Clarke, 1986,
p.47). However, in Sunderland virtually all of the men who set up the
new iron shipbuilding yards during
the current research period were
from a background in wood shipbuilding (Table 1). The development of the Laing and Doxford
shipyards, the subjects of the current research, are examined in more
detail in the next section.
The Laing and Doxford
shipyards
In 1792, Philip Laing abandoned
the profession of medicine to become a partner in his brother’s
business and took over sole control
in 1818. Philip’s son James was
born in 1823, became head of the
firm in 1843 and presided over it
until his death in 1901, always employing specialists to run the dayto-day operations of the shipyard.
The Accounting Historians Notebook, October 2006
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From its beginnings Laing was a
multi-activity business, involved in
trading, shipowning and shipbuilding. Laing’s firm was innovative
and took out several shipbuilding
patents (Clarke, 1981; Jeremy,
1984-86; Smith and Holden, 1953).
The Laing shipyard was to the fore
in Sunderland’s adoption of iron
shipbuilding. Apart from the isolated exception of another yard that
launched the town’s first iron ship,
of a mere 72 tons, Laing’s shipyard
was well ahead of Sunderland’s
other shipbuilders in the adoption
of the new material and technology
of shipbuilding (Table 1): by 1858
four of its five ships built were
made of iron and, although iron
tonnage fell to only half of total
output in the following year, the
firm was established as an iron
shipbuilder (Clarke, 1986). Although the archives of the firm and
of the Wear Shipbuilders’ Association reveal no direct discussion of
the changeover from wood to iron,
the Association’s minutes do reveal
that in 1859 James Laing led a
campaign against the “oppressive
and unjust” duties imposed on timber (TWAS/EM/WS/1/l,
pp.117‑127), indicating the ongoing importance of that raw material.
The available sources present
rather differing views regarding the
background of the Doxford family.
The introduction to the Doxford
archive (TWAS 1811) states,
William Doxford senior had
a small wood shipyard . .
The Accounting Historians Notebook, October 2006
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which he began in 1840. He
and his partner were declared
bankrupt the following year,
and he returned to working
as a craftsman for another
firm. The partnership was reestablished in 1845 and continued until 1851, when once
again William senior returned to working partly as a
shipwright and partly as a
timber merchant.
However, Clarke (1986, p.72)
states that “the family yard had
almost twenty years of continuous
existence before… it began
(building). . . iron vessels in 1864”.
Furthermore, the Doxford accounting archive (TWAS 1811/12/4)
indicates that William and J. Doxford were in partnership as timber
merchants as early as 1833 and
later moved into shipbuilding. Despite the differing views presented
by these sources, they do all confirm that the background of William Doxford was in wood rather
than in metals engineering or general trading business. William's
son, William Theodore, 1841 –
1916, was probably responsible in
1864 for starting the family shipyard’s changeover from wood to
iron shipbuilding (Clarke, 1986).
Accounting information for
decision-making
An analysis (McLean, 1995) of
the nineteenth century Laing and
Doxford accounting records indicates that each firm operated a mer(Continued on page 6)
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(Continued from page 5)

cantile double-entry accounting
system adapted to include a form of
contract accounting for shipbuilding activities, thus enabling the
calculation of cost and profit or
loss on each ship constructed.
However, there were differences
between the accounting systems.
Laing included data which Doxford
did not: Laing’s ship accounts routinely included a note of ship tonnage, which would have facilitated
a calculation per ton of selling
price, cost and profit or loss, although such calculations are not
extant. Neverthless, tonnage data
was, of course, available in Doxford outside of the accounting system and it would have been
straightforward to make the relevant calculations, although none
are extant. A further difference between the systems lay in approaches to periodicity. Whereas
Doxford’s system was based
around the half-yearly calculation
of profit for the firm, Laing’s system was not. Unlike Doxford,
Laing was also a trading and shipowning firm and when
Laing built and operated a
ship as owners, that ship’s
account reflected its building
cost, voyage profits and, ultimately, the selling price obtained on the eventual sale of
the ship and the final overall
profit made over its entire
life cycle with the firm . . .
Profit measurement was not
periodic, but was based on
6
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ventures and on the ship as a
focus of economic activity
(ibid, p.124).
It is conceivable that, by focusing on profit over the life-cycle of
the ship rather than the calculation
of half-yearly company profit, the
Laing accounting system acted as a
form of social technology enabling
the development of a long-term
view of the business in general and
the changeover from wood to iron
in particular. Nevertheless it is apparent from the 1861 Sunderland
Herald quoted above that the respective costs and profits per ton of
wood and iron were common
knowledge and that the relatively
small and tight-knit community of
Sunderland shipbuilders would
have been well aware of them.
Discussion
Laing began iron shipbuilding in
1853, significantly earlier than
Doxford’s entry into the industry in
1864. Although Laing’s accounting
system provided a longer term perspective than did Doxford’s it is
unlikely that this explains the difference in entry dates. Both accounting systems enabled the calculation of costs and profits per ton
for each ship built and this information could be viewed in the context of comparative cost and profit
data for wood and iron ships which
were freely available in the market
place. Thus it is improbable that
differences in information availability can explain the difference in
timing of entry into iron shipbuildThe Accounting Historians Notebook, October 2006
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ing, and answers must be sought
elsewhere.
A new iron shipyard needed to
be financed of course, but the
available evidence suggests that
this in itself need not have prevented Doxford from making the
changeover earlier than it did. By
the 1850s, Doxford was a wellestablished business, making profits of £1,872 in the 6 months to 30
December 1854, for example,
(McLean, 1995) and other Sunderland shipbuilders such as Oswald
and Pile were able to finance iron
yards earlier from no more favourable circumstances (Clarke, 1986).
It is improbable, therefore, that
lack of finance explains Doxford’s
later entry into iron shipbuilding.
Insights into the problem of delayed entry into iron shipbuilding
are provided by Harley (1973) and
Clarke (1986). In the context of the
North American shipbuilding industry, Harley contends that delayed entry into iron shipbuilding
was not due to prejudice, ignorance
and inertia, but due to factors such
as the immobility of labour. However such labour problems did not
arise in Sunderland where shipbuilders were able to draw on
North East England’s pool of
skilled metal-workers as Laing in
fact did do. However Harley also
notes shipbuilders’ willingness to
accept lower but adequate returns
in order to persist with wood shipbuilding. Similarly Clarke (1986,
p.72) has argued that Sunderland’s
wood shipbuilders “continued to
The Accounting Historians Notebook, October 2006
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find enough customers and accommodating credit from timber merchants to continue in their old
ways”, and, moreover, continued to
benefit from the repair work
needed by existing wood fleets.
Nevertheless, in considering delayed entry into iron shipbuilding it
is not sufficient simply to examine
the technical and structural factors
affecting the decision-making process. As Parker (1981, p.131) has
remarked “a history of accounting .
. . without some knowledge of the
actors – those for whom as well as
those by whom the records were
kept – must be rather anaemic and
thin”. The “actors” relevant to the
current research are James Laing,
William Doxford and William
Theodore Doxford. In 1853 when
James Laing took his business into
iron shipbuilding he was 30 years
old, a successful innovator, the
head of a firm that had been in continuous existence for over 60 years
and a businessman rather than a
wood-working shipwright and
shipbuilder. In comparison, in
1853, William Doxford was 41
years old, with 20 years of experience of basing his working life
around wood, as a timber merchant, a working shipwright and a
shipbuilder and, possibly, as a
bankrupt. The Doxford shipbuilding moved into iron shipbuilding
only in 1864, probably under the
direction of William’s son, the 23
years old William Theodore Doxford (Clarke, 1986).
(Continued on page 8)
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Conclusions
In the context of freely available
market information, both the Laing
and Doxford accounting systems
provided clear data on the costs and
profitability of shipbuilding. Although there were differences in
the systems, particularly in terms of
reporting time-frames, it is unlikely
that these are significant in explaining the different entry dates into
iron shipbuilding. Working experience and skills, age, personality
and business outlook are probable
causal factors in James Laing’s
early entry into iron shipbuilding,
William Doxford’s commitment to
wood shipbuilding and William
Theodore Doxford’s success in
making the changeover.
Note 1: All of the archives drawn
upon for this research are held by
the Tyne Wear Archive Service
(TWAS), Blandford Street, Newcastle Upon Tyne, Great Britain.
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